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Abstract: The events of the fall of 2014 in the Russian currency market forced Bank of Russia to change the exchange 
rate regime in the national economy. In this study we show that in 2014 the regulator was trying to protect ruble (the 
Russian national currency) against a massive speculative attack, actively spending its international reserves, but the 
interventions proved quite ineffective. Moreover, the peculiarity of the structure of these reserves dictated a very limited 
range of maneuver for the central bank, forcing it to switch to the free floating exchange rate regime in the first half of 
November, 2014 – an important event, which, actually, could have been predicted by the lay experts on the basis of 
publically available information and application of simple econometric models. Noteworthy to say that, although not 
expectedly to the lay population, this switch of the exchange rate regime was done by Bank of Russia quite timely. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, the central banks in the emerging 
economies often have to achieve several objectives 
simultaneously, one of the main of these being 
stabilizing the national currency exchange rate. 
Completing this task is becoming more difficult in the 
contractive global economic environment after the 
global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009. These ideas 
were brilliantly summarized in June 2016 by Zhou 
Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of China, 
who also emphasized the importance of independence 
of central banks (Zhou 2016). 
As it was officially stated by the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation (Bank of Russia), since 1999 the 
regulator “carried out a consecutive exchange rate 
policy to form the necessary grounds for transition to 
the free floating exchange rate regime of ruble”1. One 
of the purposes of such policy was to “substantially 
decrease the intervention of Bank of Russia in the 
national currency exchange rate formation to be able to 
carry out independent monetary policy in order to target 
inflation” (Bank of Russia 2017a). 
One of the important steps in this direction, as 
declared by Bank of Russia, was introduction of a 
special exchange rate policy tool in February 2005 – 
the dual-currency basket which has been a weighted 
average of the ruble exchange rates to two currencies 
– the US dollar (USD) and euro – combined in a  
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1Ruble is the official currency of the Russian Federation. 
special proportion (0.55 for the USD and 0.45 for euro). 
This tool was actively used by Bank of Russia during 
the GFC and allegedly helped the Russian central bank 
to carry out an exchange rate policy which was easier 
to understand by the lay public. Monitoring to the 
dynamics of this dual-currency basket, the regulator 
gradually depreciated the ruble/USD and ruble/euro 
nominal exchange rates during the GFC – but, 
evidently, too gradually and slowly, which became a 
major point of the expert discussion and criticism 
towards the Russian central bank of that time. 
But, right before the national currency crisis (NCC) 
in Russia in the late 2014 – early 2015, Bank of Russia 
suddenly adopted another strategy. According to its 
press-release “On the main parameters of the 
exchange rate policy of Bank of Russia”, issued on the 
10th of November, 2014, since that date Bank of Russia 
“abolished the exchange rate policy mechanism 
through cancelling the permissible range of the dual-
currency basket ruble values (operational band) and 
regular interventions on and outside the borders of this 
band” (Bank of Russia 2014b). 
Thus, after almost 15 years of preparation and 
regular promises to switch to free floating exchange 
rate regime, this decision of Bank of Russia sprang up 
as a surprise to the Russian economy in quite a difficult 
time-period of the fall of 2014. 
The current research has the main objective of 
studying the conditions under which such decision was 
taken in order to understand whether it was possible to 
anticipate this course of events. To this end, we 
analyze the two principle aspects which accompanied 
this decision in the fall of 2014 – (1) the dynamics of 
the Russian international reserves from the perspective 
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of their actual adequacy, and (2) the efficacy of the 
currency interventions of Bank of Russia of that time. 
To address these two issues, the rest of the paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2 reconstructs the 
principal events of the second half of 2014. In section 3 
the methodology (experiment design) and sample 
description are provided. In Section 4, using basic 
econometric models, forecasts for a number of 
principal indicators of the currency market are built. 
Section 5 discusses the results of calculations from the 
perspectives of the level of adequacy of the Russian 
international reserves and the efficacy of currency 
interventions of Bank of Russia. Section 6 concludes. 
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE MACROECONOMIC 
EVENTS IN RUSSIA IN 2014 
There were several major “unpleasant” surprises to 
the Russian economy in 2014. In the early 2014, the 
Western countries introduced economic sanctions 
against Russia as a reaction to Crimea’s re-association 
to the Russian Federation. In the middle of 2014, the 
price of oil, which Russian exports have been crucially 
depended on, in the world market started to fall 
dramatically. In October 2014, after witnessing the 
dramatic fall in the oil price, Bank of Russia started 
active interventions to the national currency market in 
an attempt to support ruble (after several months of 
absence of such interventions). 
Figure 1 gives the dynamics of several 
macroeconomic indicators important to the current 
research – the price of Brent oil; the ruble/USD nominal 
exchange rate; the total stock of international reserves 
and the volumes of currency interventions of Bank of 
Russia – for the period from April to October 2014. 
As it can be seen from the graph, the currency 
interventions of Bank of Russia in October 2014 proved 
quite ineffective in supporting ruble, while the main 
driver for the ruble/USD exchange rate dynamics was 
the price of Brent oil. This idea will be elaborated below 
in Section 4.2. 
By the end of October 2014, the situation in the 
Russian currency market was as follows: 
• due to a sharp decrease in the Brent oil price (by 
about 20% since the early July 2014), ruble 
depreciated by about 22% as well; 
• the currency interventions did not work the way 
they were supposed to work, forcing Bank of 
Russia to actively spend its limited international 
currency reserves following the Bank’s obligation 
to support the national currency; 
 
Figure 1: The dynamics of macroeconomic indicators (end-of-week data). 
Sources: Bank of Russia (www.cbr.ru), The US Energy Information Administration (www.eia.gov). 
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• the key interest rate2 of Bank of Russia remained 
8%, which allowed for extensive currency carry-
trade operations in the national currency market, 
putting substantial depreciative pressure on 
ruble. 
It is not surprising then, that on the 31st of October, 
2014, at the scheduled meeting of the Board of 
Directors of the Bank of Russia Board, it was decided 
to increase the key interest rate from 8% to 9.5% to 
support the national currency by contracting money 
supply (Bank of Russia 2014a). 
Unfortunately, these measures – substantial 
currency interventions (which peaked 13.2 bln USD in 
the last week of October 2014) and the increase of the 
key interest rate – were of little help in supporting the 
national currency, thus, threatening the exhaustion of 
the international reserves of Bank of Russia. Then, on 
the 10th of November, 2014, Bank of Russia took the 
decision of switching to the free floating exchange rate 
of ruble, giving up on further obligatory support of the 
Russian currency. As a result, ruble depreciated by 
another 17% by the end of November 2014, during 
which Bank of Russia made no currency interventions 
at all. 
But even this, quite radical step did not help to 
completely defeat massive currency carry-trade 
operations in the national currency market. Thus, on 
the 16th of December, 2014, Bank of Russia was again 
forced to dramatically increase the key interest rate up 
to 17%, making ruble sharply depreciate against USD 
by about 5% by the end of that day. 
All these shocks hit the Russian economy quite 
severely. In the 1st quarter of 2015, the real GDP 
dropped by 2.8% year-on-year (YoY), while consumer 
inflation in March 2015 reached 16.9% YoY (Rosstat 
2017).  
But the primary interest of this study is in answering 
the question of whether the “sudden” decision of Bank 
of Russia to switch to the free floating exchange rate 
regime of the national currency could have been 
anticipated by the lay experts based on publicly 
available information on the basis of permanent 
monitoring and analysis of the contemporary status of 
the Russian economy. 
                                            
2The key interest rate is the basic rate at which Bank of Russia borrows from/ 
lends to commercial banks on a short-term basis. 
Thus, we put forward the following two research 
hypotheses: 
(RH1) Switching to the free floating exchange rate 
regime in November 2014 could have been anticipated 
on the basis of publicly available information. 
(RH2) Bank of Russia fought against a speculative 
attack (a ‘bubble’) in the national currency market in 
October 2014, this is why its interventions were 
ineffective. 
It should also be emphasized that, as to our 
knowledge, there has been no similar study in the 
literature on the Russian economy of the period of fall 
2014. 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Experiment Design 
To test the above-stated research hypotheses, we 
propose the following “thought experiment”. 
Let’s imagine, that it is now the very end of October 
2014, virtually, the evening of Friday, the 31st of 
October. Bank of Russia had already intervened the 
national currency market by raising the key interest rate 
up to 9.5% in order to attempt to support ruble and to 
fight the speculative attack in the market. 
What could have been further projections for ruble 
and, thus, for the monetary policy of Bank of Russia? 
Could the switch to the floating exchange rate of ruble 
have been predicted somehow? Could this switch have 
been the result of expected insufficiency of the 
international reserves of Bank of Russia? 
In order to answer these questions, we use 
information publicly available by the 1st of November, 
2014, and apply several quite basic econometric 
models to construct the necessary projections. 
Specifically, at the first step, we project the price of 
Brent oil for November 2014, since it has been well 
known that the ruble/USD exchange rate is very tightly 
correlated to that price due to the existing substantial 
dependence of the Russian economy on exports of 
natural resources, primarily, crude oil. 
At the second step, we apply the constructed 
forecasts of Brent oil price to predict the ruble/USD 
exchange rate through November 2014. And then, at 
the third step, we employ the obtained ruble/USD 
exchange rate predicted values to estimate the 
184     Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, 2017, Vol. 6 Evgenii V. Gilenko 
dynamics of the amount of international reserves of 
Bank of Russia for the same period. 
It should be emphasized that in this research 
econometric models merely play role of mathematical 
devices used for the purposes of forecasting, so, a 
thorough analysis of their statistical properties is not of 
primary interest. This is due to the fact that for 
forecasting purposes it is more crucial for the model to 
have the highest possible goodness-of-fit leaving purity 
of statistical properties aside. Although, it should be 
mentioned, that the latter properties of the estimated 
models are very adequate. 
3.2. Sample Description 
This research is majorly based on end-of-week data 
for the period from July to October 2014, which is used 
as the training sample to estimate econometric models. 
November 2014, thus, represents the test sample 
(when possible). 
The choice of the end-of-week type of data is 
motivated by two facts. First, since we deal with 
(volatile) financial information, it is well known that it is 
by the end of trading period that the price of a financial 
asset includes all available information. Thus, this type 
of data is robust to potential intra-week fluctuation of 
the studied financial variables (especially, exchange 
rates). 
Second, for the macroeconomic variables (such as 
international reserves) weekly data is the minimum 
available time-span. Since in this research we use a 
combination of different economic variables, weekly 
(end-of-week) data is an adequate choice to provide 
enough observations for the training sample as well. 
Initially, the period from April to October 2014 was 
considered as the training sample. The final choice of a 
shorter time-period (from July to October 2014) was 
motivated by the fact that it is in July 2014 that the 
price of Brent oil started to sharply decrease in the 
world market. This fact is supported not only by the 
actual observations from the oil market (see Figure 1), 
but also by a modern formal test for structural breaks. 
As such test, we chose the penalized contrasts 
approach which was proposed by Lavielle (2005) for 
estimating the number of change-points and their 
locations in the time-series, and which is more powerful 
than the previously known algorithms (such as ICSS, 
for example). 
The application of the Lavielle’s test to the time-
series of the Brent oil prices allowed to detect the only 
change-point on the 4th of July, 2014 (see Figure 1). 
Thus, our final end-of-week training sample starts on 
the 11th of July, 2014, and ends on the 31st of 
October, 2014. 
We did not formally run other sophisticated 
statistical tests (e.g., non-stationarity tests) on our 
variables, since, as it was mentioned above, the 
econometric models in this study were used merely for 
forecasting purposes, not for statistical inference. 
4. RESULTS OF CALCULATIONS 
According to the steps of the above-described 
experiment design, here we provide the results of 
necessary calculations. 
4.1. Forecasting the Price of Brent Oil  
In this section, our task is to forecast the price of 
Brent oil through November 2014. To this end, based 
on preliminary visual analysis of the Brent oil price 
dynamics (see Figure 1), we adopted and estimated by 
the OLS routine a basic model of the following type3: 
Brentt =106.07 ***(0.493) ! 0.07 ***(0.003) " t
2 .         (1) 
where Brentt  is the current value of Brent oil price; t  is 
the time index; standard errors are given in 
parentheses under the coefficients; *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level of significance (provided as 
additional information).  
Surprisingly, but with respect to different goodness-
of-fit metrics, Model (1) outperformed other models 
(even of the ARIMA-type) which we also estimated on 
the training sample. Specifically, multiple R-squared of 
Model (1) was 0.9735; root mean squared error 
(RMSE) was 1.20 ($ per barrel); mean average 
percentage error (MAPE) was 1.12 (%). 
Visual representation of the adequacy of Model (1) 
is given in Figure 2 (to save space, the results only for 
the fall of 2014 are presented in the graph). It can be 
seen that the model’s forecasts for the training (white 
area) and the test (grey area) samples are, on average, 
quite close to the actual values of the price of Brent oil.  
                                            
3Although the statistical properties of Model (1) are not of primary interest to us, 
here we provide results of the traditional tests for this model. The F-test 
statistic = 550.8 with p-value = 3.071e-13; the Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
statistic W = 0.95 with p-value = 0.419; the Durbin-Watson test statistic DW = 
1.70 with p-value=0.176; the Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity test statistic 
BP = 0.82 with p-value = 0.365; the RESET test statistic = 0.98 with p-value = 
0.403. Thus, the results of these tests indicate statistical adequacy of Model 
(1). 
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For the purposes of further discussion (see Section 
5), it is worth noting that the obtained projections of the 
price of Brent oil for November 2014 were less 
optimistic than the actually observed values. This 
means that depreciation of ruble could have expected 
even stronger given the tight correlation between the 
ruble exchange rate and the price of Brent oil (see the 
following section). 
4.2. The Ruble/USD Exchange Rate Dynamics 
Prediction 
Having predicted the values of Brent oil price for 
November, 2014, we constructed a basic model and 
projected the potential dynamics of ruble for that same 
period, using the obtained forecast values of the oil 
prices. 
Due to the well-known high degree of dependence 
of the Russian economy on exports of oil (and other 
natural resource), the value of ruble/USD nominal 
exchange rate has been strongly dependent on the 
Brent oil price dynamics since the early 2000s. Thus, 
for modeling purposes, it was natural to relate these 
two variables. As it can be seen from Figure 3, a 
straight-forward pair-wise econometric model can be 
applied to describe the relationship between the two 
variables. 
Preliminary, Figure 3 depicts one more peculiarity 
which concerns the fact that the Bank of Russia’s 
interventions in the national currency market in October 
2014 were virtually ineffective (under the superseding 
influence of the global oil market). We will get back to 
discussion of this fact later in Section 5. 
Still, to formally reflect the idea of presence of these 
interventions in October 2014, we initially introduced a 
binary variable bvInterv (taking 1 for October 2014, and 
0 – otherwise) in Model (2). Our calculations showed 
no statistically significant influence from the part of this 
binary variable, so, it was excluded from the final 
version of Model (2) presented as follows4: 
RubleUSDt = 70.18 ***(1.844) ! 0.33***(0.019) " Brentt .        (2) 
where RubleUSDt  is the ruble/USD nominal exchange 
rate; Brentt  is the price of Brent oil; standard errors are 
given in parentheses under the coefficients; *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level of significance (provided as 
additional information). 
                                            
4The formal results of the traditional tests for Model (2) are as follows. The F-
test statistic = 308.5 with p-value = 2.051e-11; the Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
statistic W = 0.96 with p-value = 0.59; the Durbin-Watson test statistic DW = 
1.71 with p-value = 0.184; the Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity test statistic 
BP = 1.07 with p-value = 0.30; the RESET test statistic = 0.04 with p-value = 
0.97. Thus, the results indicate statistical adequacy of Model (2). 
 
Figure 2: Performance of Model (1). 
Note: the shaded (grey) area in the graph represents November, 2014 (the test sample). 
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The goodness-of-fit metrics demonstrated a high 
quality of Model (2). Specifically, multiple R-squared of 
the model was 0.9536; root mean squared error 
(RMSE) was 0.54 (ruble per USD); mean average 
percentage error (MAPE) was 1.21 (%). 
Figure 4 illustrates the performance of Model (2), 
where the use of previously obtained Brent oil price 
forecasts was made. To save space, the results only 
for the fall of 2014 are presented in the graph. The 
shaded areas given in the graph are necessary to 
comment on. The dark-grey area represents the first 
week of November, 2014, when Bank of Russia did not 
yet introduce the free floating exchange rate regime. 
Thus, we can even compare the predicted value of the 
exchange rate (43.4 rubles per USD) with the actual 
one (46.6 rubles per USD). It can be seen that the 
former (predicted) value is quite optimistic. 
The light-grey area in the graph reflects the period 
of ruble exchange rate fluctuations under now the free 
floating exchange rate regime introduced on the 10th of 
November, 2014. So, the actual values of the 
exchange rate cannot be compared with the predicted 
ones. 
Still, the constructed projections (in the light-grey 
area) quite sufficiently underestimate the actual 
depreciation of ruble in November, 2014. But, for the 
purposes of further discussion (see Section 5), this, 
actually, is even better. Because in this case the 
obtained forecasts reflect some sort of ‘baseline’ – not 
the worst case – scenario. 
This means the following: If under this ‘baseline’ 
scenario we would be able to show that spending of 
international reserves by Bank of Russia would have 
resulted in their severe insufficiency and this fact had 
caused the switch to the free floating exchange rate 
regime, then this would be a consistent proof that the 
actual situation would have been even worse (if ruble 
had depreciated much deeper). This also would mean 
that the timely reaction of Bank of Russia to the 
situation in the national currency market was 
appropriate. 
4.3. International Reserves Dynamics Prediction 
The final step of our “thought experiment” related 
the dynamics of the ruble/USD exchange rate to the 
dynamics of the international reserves of Bank of 
Russia. 
Changes in the global and local currency markets in 
the second half of 2014 expectedly led to changes in 
the amounts of the international reserves of Bank of 
 
Figure 3: Pair-wise relationship between Brent oil price and ruble/USD nominal exchange rate. 
Note: The red dots in the graph designate October 2014, the period of active interventions of Bank of Russia in the national 
currency market. 
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Russia. Moreover, as we mentioned above, in October 
2014, to support the national currency, Bank of Russia 
started to actively spend its international reserves, with 
their amount continuing to decrease exponentially (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 5 depicts the relationship between the 
ruble/USD exchange rate and the amount of 
international reserves of Bank of Russia in the second 
half of 2014. It can be seen from the graph that it is not 
only that there is a clear linear association between the 
 
Figure 4: Performance of Model (2). 
Note: The light and dark shaded areas are commented in the text. 
 
Figure 5: Relationship between the ruble exchange rate and the international reserves of Bank of Russia. 
Note: The red dots in the graph designate October 2014, the period of active interventions of Bank of Russia in the national 
currency market. 
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two variables, but also this association is piece-wise 
linear with a distinct shift corresponding to October 
2014. 
Thus, on the one hand, again, a basic model can be 
adequately applied here, but, on the other hand, this 
model has to take into account this piece-wise linearity. 
To construct an adequate model, we used the binary 
variable bvInterv corresponding to the period of 
October 2014 (as it was described above in Section 
4.2), and introduced it into the model for international 
reserves in the following manner5: 
IntRest = 607.82 ***(9.676) ! 3.87 ***(0.263) " RubleUSDt +153.81***(31.69) " bvIntervt !
! 3.86 ***
(0.773)
" [RubleUSDt " bvIntervt ].
             (3) 
where IntRest  is the amount of international reserves of 
Bank of Russia; RubleUSDt  is the ruble/USD nominal 
exchange rate; RubleUSDt ! bvIntervt  represents the 
interaction term to capture piece-wise linearity in the 
data; standard errors are given in parentheses under 
the coefficients; *** denotes significance at the 1% level 
of significance (provided as additional information). 
The goodness-of-fit metrics demonstrated high 
quality of Model (3) as well. Specifically, multiple R-
squared of the model was 0.9886; root mean squared 
error (RMSE) was 1.34 (bln USD); mean average 
percentage error (MAPE) was 0.25 (%). 
It is worth mentioning the following. As the 
estimation of Model (3) showed, it was not even 
necessary to include in the model the specific amounts 
of per week currency interventions of Bank of Russia in 
October 2014, which may have introduced problems 
because the interventions were of non-regular kind. 
This is to say that it would have been be rather difficult 
to mathematically correctly describe the pattern of the 
October interventions, not to mention that for further 
prediction purposes it would have been really 
problematic to imagine which amounts of interventions 
Bank of Russia would have introduced to the national 
currency market in November 2014. The used binary 
variable bvInterv, on the one hand, allowed to 
effectively overcome this difficulty, and, on the other 
hand, proved to be of great help in further forecasting. 
                                            
5The formal results of the traditional tests for Model (3) are as follows. The F-
test statistic = 376.4 with p-value = 7.013e-13; the Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
statistic W = 0.93 with p-value = 0.207; the Durbin-Watson test statistic DW = 
2.54 with p-value = 0.665; the Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity test statistic 
BP = 4.48 with p-value = 0.214; the RESET test statistic = 1.17 with p-value = 
0.345. Thus, the results indicate statistical adequacy of Model (3). 
Using the previously obtained predicted values for 
the ruble/USD exchange rate for November 2014, as 
well as assuming continuation of Bank of Russia’s 
currency interventions in November 2014 (meaning 
bvInterv=1), we predicted the potential changes in the 
international reserves of Bank of Russia for that period. 
The results are given in Figure 6.  
Again, the light-grey and dark-grey areas are 
specified in Figure 6. The dark-grey area represents 
the first week of November, 2014 (before the switch to 
the floating exchange rate regime). It can be seen that 
the predicted stock of international reserves (425 bln 
USD) is very close to the actual one (421 bln USD). 
The actual figures in the light-grey area are not 
comparable to the predicted ones (due to the switch to 
the floating exchange rate regime), but the projections 
clearly indicate the expected (or, to say, optimistic) 
amount of international reserves (402 bln USD), had 
Bank of Russia not made the switch and continued its 
currency interventions. 
Having run the necessary calculations, we now get 
to the discussion of why the above-described findings 
are important, and how they help to support our 
research hypotheses. 
5. DISCUSSION 
5.1. The (in)Sufficiency of International Reserves of 
Bank of Russia in the Late 2014 
As our calculations showed above, the projections 
of Brent oil price, ruble/USD nominal exchange rate, 
and the amounts of international reserves of Bank of 
Russia, obtained for November 2014, as compared to 
the actual November values of these indicators (of 
course, unknown in October 2014), constituted quite a 
“baseline” (not the worst case) scenario for Bank of 
Russia. 
But even under this “baseline” scenario, had Bank 
of Russia continued its support of ruble in November 
2014, the (projected) stock of international reserves 
would drop down to 402 bln USD. Actually, as the first 
week of November, 2014, showed (see Figure 4), the 
depreciation of ruble was deeper than predicted in the 
end of October, 2014, meaning that by the end of 
November, 2014, the stock of international reserves 
would have dropped much below 400 bln USD. 
But what would that situation have contradicted to? 
To answer this principal question, we need to look 
at what is called international reserves adequacy 
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criteria (IRAC) – the indicators, actively developed and 
improved, in particular, by the International Monetary 
Fund. As of now, there are several IRAC developed in 
the literature: both traditional criteria, such as the 
import coverage, the Greenspan-Guidotti, and the 
Reddy rules, and modern criteria, such as ARA EM 
optimal reserve model proposed by the International 
Monetary Fund in 2013. A comprehensive overview of 
different IRAC, as well as the description of the ARA 
EM model can be found in (International Monetary 
Fund 2013). 
Bank of Russia routinely calculates the values of a 
number of these IRAC. These figures for the period 
under study are given in Table 1 (panel A). Direct 
comparison of the official international reserves of Bank 
of Russia (Table 1, line 8, columns (3)-(5)) to the 
values of these IRAC (Table 1, lines 1-4, columns (3)-
(5)) creates an illusion that the international reserves 
were adequate and sufficient of that time. But this was 
not the actual situation. 
An important thing to be kept in mind here is that 
according to the methodology of the Russian 
international reserves composition, the money of two 
Russian sovereign wealth funds (the National Wealth 
Fund and the Reserve Fund) has also been part of the 
Russian international reserves since 2008 (Bank of 
Russia 2017b). And, as it can be seen from Table 1, 
these two sovereign wealth funds constituted a 
substantial part of the international reserves of Russia. 
The two funds were created in 2008 to absorb the 
oil export incomes of Russia. The Reserve Fund has 
been aimed at supporting the Russian economy when 
oil and gas incomes fall, while the National Wealth 
Fund's main objective has been to support the Russian 
pension system. The two funds have been controlled 
by the Ministry of Finance of Russia. 
In any case, the money from these funds could not 
be used by Bank of Russia to make interventions in 
order to support the national currency. This virtually 
means that in order to calculate the disposable amount 
of international reserves of Bank of Russia, we should 
subtract the money of these funds from the total 
international reserves. This is done in line 9 of Table 1. 
It can be seen that the disposable amount of 
international reserves in 2014 was stably lower than 
one of the IRAC – the Reddy’s rule. 
After discussing these considerations, we hopefully 
are ready to address the main question of this study – 
why Bank of Russia “suddenly” decided to introduce 
the free floating exchange rate regime? 
To do so, we needed to use our projection of the 
amount of international reserves for November 2014, 
 
Figure 6: The projected changes in the international reserves of Bank of Russia. 
Note: Light and dark shaded areas are commented in the text. 
190     Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, 2017, Vol. 6 Evgenii V. Gilenko 
as well as calculate some other figures in column (6) of 
Table 1. Unlike Bank of Russia and the Ministry of 
Finance, the lay experts (including us) cannot 
operatively calculate the necessary indicators. This is 
why here, to calculate the indicators in lines 1-7 for the 
1st of December, 2014 (column (6)), we used simple 
linear extrapolations of the following kind: 
X01.12.2014 = X01.10.2014 !
2
3 " (X01.07.2014 ! X01.10.2014 ),        (4) 
where X stands for the corresponding indicator (in lines 
1-6) on the specified date, while factor 23  reflects the 
first two months (October and November) of the three 
months in the 4th quarter of 2014. 
The information for line 8 of column (6) was taken 
from our projections in Figure 6. Line 9 of column (6) 
was calculated automatically, where as an estimate of 
the disposable international reserves by the 1st of 
December, 2014, we got 230.1 bln USD. And this 
figure became very indicative, when we compared it to 
the value of ARA EM criterion which for the same date 
was 237.9 bln USD. 
This means that by the 1st of December, 2014, the 
stock of international reserves of Bank of Russia may 
easily not have met the ARA EM and some other 
criteria. Needless to say, that the ARA EM rule has 
been one of the most powerful tools for international 
reserves adequacy assessment of nowadays, while our 
estimate of 402.0 bln USD of the Russian international 
reserves was quite optimistic since it corresponded to 
the “baseline” scenario (as discussed above). 
So, it may very well be the case that after making 
projections within a similar “thought experiment” and 
seeing a prominent threat to its reserves, Bank of 
Russia took the timely decision of switching to the free 
floating exchange rate regime – the decision which was 
supported by the events of the first week of November, 
2014, when ruble depreciated even more than could 
have been expected. 
And, in this sense, the above described course of 
events (with the introduction of the free floating 
exchange rate regime) could have been predicted by 
the lay experts to happen in the middle of November 
2014, based on publicly available information and on 
basic econometric projections. This finding supports 
our first research hypothesis. 
5.2. The Inefficacy of the Currency Interventions of 
Bank of Russia 
The fact that the currency interventions of Bank of 
Russia in October, 2014, were ineffective casts almost 
no doubts now. This can be indirectly supported by the 
fact that on the 31st of October, 2014, Bank of Russia 
was forced to increase the key interest rate from 8% to 
9.5% (see also Section 2). Also, as it was mentioned in 
Table 1: International Reserves of Bank of Russia: Adequacy Criteria and Sufficiency, bln USD 
# date 01.04.2014 01.07.2014 01.10.2014 01.12.2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)* 
 Panel A. International reserves adequacy criteria 
1 The 3-month import coverage rule 116.5 115.6 113.4 111.9 
2 The Greenspan-Guidotti’s rule 227.5 231.4 205.2 187.7 
3 The Reddy’s rule 344.0 347.0 318.6 299.7 
4 The IMF ARA EM model 277.5 291.7 259.4 237.9 
 Panel B. Russian Sovereign Wealth Funds 
5 The National Wealth Fund 87.5 87.9 83.2 80.1 
6 The Reserve Fund 87.5 87.3 90.0 91.8 
7 Total (line 5 plus line 6) 175.0 175.2 173.2 171.9 
 Panel C. International reserves: official and disposable 
8 Actual amount of international reserves 486.1 478.3 454.2 402.0 
9 Disposable amount of international reserves* (line 8 minus line 7) 311.1 303.1 281.0 230.1 
Note: * figures in the corresponding column and row were calculated by the author. 
Source: Bank of Russia (www.cbr.ru), the Ministry of Finance of Russia (www.minfin.ru), author’s calculations. 
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Section 3.4, our own calculations showed that the 
interventions had no significant influence on supporting 
ruble. But why? 
One of the answers to that question may be found 
in the fact that Bank of Russia was fighting against a 
“bubble” in the national currency market, caused by a 
tremendous speculative attack via currency carry-trade 
operations. Such speculative attacks, if successful, 
“traditionally” lead to a severe national currency crisis. 
The well-known example here is a number of currency 
crises in the 1990s: the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) crises of 1992-1993, the Latin crisis 
of 1994-1995, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998; the 
Russian crisis of 1998. 
To support this idea, we collected end-of-day 
market values of the ruble/USD nominal exchange rate 
for the period from April to October, 2014, and applied 
one of the modern test for ‘bubble’ detection – the 
Phillips-Wu-Yu SADF test (Phillips, Wu, and Yu 2011) 
to detect ‘bubbles’ in financial markets. 
The results of the SADF test application are given in 
Figure 7. According to this test, the values of the SADF 
test statistic (the blue line) above the simulated critical 
values (given in red) speak in favor of a ‘bubble’ 
presence. It can be seen in Figure 7 that it is exactly in 
October, 2014, the test indicates the presence of a 
‘bubble’ – a speculative appreciation of the US dollar 
against ruble (and, correspondingly, sharp depreciation 
of ruble). 
This means that it was very difficult to expect the 
currency interventions of Bank of Russia in October 
2014 to be efficient against such speculative attack. 
This finding is, actually, in line with the existing 
literature which doubts the usefulness of interventions, 
especially, during currency crises. Specifically, 
currency crisis models point at the ineffectiveness of 
interventions when the exchange rate is inconsistent 
with other macroeconomic policies, with intervention 
even possibly increasing the degree of a speculative 
attack (Sarno and Taylor 2001). For example, 
Dominguez (2003) used high frequency intra-day data 
for the USA, Japan, and Germany and showed that the 
efficacy of interventions depends on the characteristics 
of the currency market. Adler and Tovar (2011) found 
that for emerging markets during the episodes of 
pressure on the national currency, interventions cannot 
significantly affect the level of the exchange rate. In a 
survey on the effectiveness of currency interventions in 
emerging markets, Ostry, Ghosh, and Chamon (2012) 
found that the evidence on the efficacy of interventions 
in emerging market economies is mixed. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Summing up the discussion in this paper, it should 
be emphasized that the events of the fall of 2014 in the 
Russian currency market forced Bank of Russia to 
change the exchange rate regime in the national 
economy. 
 
Figure 7: The Phillips-Wu-Yu SADF test results for ruble/USD exchange rate (daily data). 
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In this study we showed that in 2014 the regulator 
was trying to protect ruble against a massive 
speculative attack, actively spending its international 
reserves, but the interventions proved quite ineffective. 
Moreover, the peculiarity of the structure of these 
reserves dictated a very limited range of maneuver for 
the central bank, forcing it to switch to the free floating 
exchange rate regime in the first half of November, 
2014 – an important event, which, actually, could have 
been predicted by the lay experts on the basis of 
publically available information and application of 
simple econometric models. 
Noteworthy to say that, although not expectedly to 
the lay population, this switch of the exchange rate 
regime was done by Bank of Russia quite timely. And it 
is partially due to this measure that head of Bank of 
Russia Elvira Nabiullina was named “Central Bank 
Governor of the Year” by Euromoney magazine in 2015 
(Euromoney 2015). 
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